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REVILO P. OLIVER
Since Tacitus completed and made public his Historiae before he finished,
and presumably before he began, the Ab excessu divi Augusti, the two works
must have circulated separately. i At some time in antiquity, however,
probably when they were transferred from rolls to codices and perhaps
in 275, when the Emperor Tacitus undertook to preserve and disseminate
the work of the great historian whom he claimed as an ancestor,^ the two
1 In Ann. XI.ii.i he refers to the later books of the Historiae ("quibus res imperatoris
Domitiani composui") as presumably well known to his readers. Tertullian in or after
197 referred to Hist. V by book-number {Apol. 16.2).— I need not remark that everyone
who now studies the works of Tacitus will owe more to Ronald Syme's Tacitus (Oxford,
1958) and Erich Koestermann's commentary on the Annales (Heidelberg, 1963- 1968)
than he can acknowledge in footnotes. For the rest, I limit myself to citing modern
studies that seem to me fundamental and directly relevant to my inquiry, and I intend
my references to include what they in turn cite; to mention and debate everything that
touches, directly or indirectly, on my subject would be to convert this article into a
long book, for which I see no need.
2 Vopiscus, Tac. 10.3, which Syme (p. 687), with reference to an earlier article of
mine, rejects as "a fable." One does not lightly disagree with Syme, but I remain un-
repentant. The Scriptores Historiae Augustae are patently the work of a vulgar mind or
minds, and no one would claim for the author or authors a concern for veracity greater
than that of a modern journalist or "publicist," but, as Syme has repeatedly said, they
are our only source for much of the period they cover, and our task is to determine, on
the basis of our pitifully scanty information from other sources and inherent plausibility,
what statements are probably historical. Since no one, so far as I know, has yet gone so
far as to deny the existence of an emperor named Claudius Tacitus, and since it is highly
unlikely that the greatest of the Roman historians had been utterly forgotten in the Third
Century, nothing is more likely than that the emperor, whether or not he was a "military
man," would have had the wit to profit from the coincidence of cognomina and bestow
on himself the lustre of a probably supposititious (though not impossible) descent from
the historian, thus acquiring a dignity and prestige that might increase his slight chance
of dying a natural death. There could have been no better way of advertising the protec-
tive eminence he thus acquired than by promulgating official commands for the dis-
semination of the works of his adopted ancestor. The story is therefore inherently plausible.
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histories were combined to form a single sequence of thirty (or more)
books in chronological order,^ possibly under the collective title, Historia
Augusta.^
It appears that only portions of one ancient codex, sadly mutilated and
dismembered, survived the Dark Ages to become the ancestor of the
manuscript that preserves for us (with lacunae) Annates I-VI and of
the manuscripts that preserve (with lacunae) Annates XI-XVI and
Historiae I-V, presenting them as a single and untitled work with books
numbered from XI to XXI. ^ Our problem arises from the fact that the
preserved portion of Book XVI takes us only to about the middle of the
year 66 and it is inconceivable that the lost part of that book could have
continued the narrative to January 69, where Book XVII ( = Hist. I)
begins.
It has been seriously argued that Tacitus, presumably after completing
the sentence that is incomplete in our text, was suddenly smitten with
fatigue and consequently decided just to "hit the high spots" thereafter
to dispose of Nero in the rest of Book XVI, and not even to mention the
events of the last six months of 68 because they had been adequately
described by another historian, perhaps Fabius Rusticus!^ Haec igitur
The passion for disbelieving as much as possible of what the Scriptores say may lead to
excess; for a salutary lesson, see the article by James H. Oliver, A.J.P., LXXXIX
(1968), pp. 345-347.
^ Hieron. Com. ad ^ach. 3.14: "Cornelius Tacitus, qui post Augustum usque ad
mortem Domitiani vitas Caesarum triginta voluminibus exaravit." The use of volumen
as a synonym oi liber is common in Cicero and later writers, so Jerome's statement cannot
be taken to imply that the thirty books were still in the form of rolls rather than codices.
To this may be added, for what it is worth, Vopiscus's reference to the historical works
of Tacitus as a liber, i.e., a single opus, almost certainly in the form of a codex or codices,
as was first pointed out by Cicero Poghirc, Studii Clasice, VI (1964), 149-154.
'^ Vopiscus, loc. cit.: "Cornelium Tacitum, scriptorem Historiae Augustae." Such a
title would also explain Jerome's description ("vitas Caesarum") of a work that he may
not have read, although he probably glanced through it for propaganda purposes.
5 In T.A.P.A., LXXXII (1951), pp. 232-261, I assembled evidence to show that the
First Medicean MS. was derived from a very ancient codex of the combined edition.
There is nothing to indicate that the Second Medicean and its congeners did not stem
from another part of the same dismembered codex. The fundamental work of Rudolf
Hanslik and his pupils indicates that there was a line of descent from that MS. that was
independent of the Second Medicean, although there are difficulties, which I discussed
briefly in Illinois Classical Studies, I (1976), pp. 216-225. The source of the preposterous
title that appears, with slight variations, in subscriptions of the Genevan family of manu-
scripts, "Actorum diurnalium Augustae historiae libri," must remain mysterious; it is
hard to believe that any part of it came from the archetype.
6 Frank Gardiner Moore, T.A.P.A., LIV (1923), pp. 5-20.
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addent qui volent collectaneis de incredibilibus philologorumJ Not only is it
inconceivable that the historian exhibited such shameless levity, but it is
obvious that, as Bretschneider pointed out years ago, Tacitus "producere
voluit Annales usque ad Nymphidii exitum, id est ad initium Historiarum,
et iam, ut ipsius utar verbis, narrationem disposuit intra se ipsum et
ordinavit, cum XV 72 scriberet."8 Bretschneider believed that one more
book might have sufficed, but we cannot disregard the calculations of
Philippe Fabia in an article confidently entitled "Sur une page perdue
et sur les livres XVI, XVII, XVIII des Annales de Tacite":^ Tacitus
could scarcely have reached the death of Nero before the end of a Book
XVIII, and if he continued to the beginning of the Historiae, at least
one more book would have been necessary. 10 We need not, however,
review these calculations: whatever the requisite number of books, we
must conclude that either (a) Tacitus did not write them, or (b) they
have been lost at some stage in the transmission of his text.
We must mention here two considerations that are relevant, though
inconclusive.
(a) We are virtually certain that Tacitus did not complete the histor-
ical study that he had undertaken. We must believe that he intended to
keep the promise that he made in Ann. III. 24. 3 to treat the Age of
Augustus, "si effectis in quae tetendi plures ad curas vitam produxero."
When he resolved to begin his study with the end of the Republic, we
do not know: that could have been part of his original plan, announced
in Agr. 3.3: "non . . . pigebit . . . memoriam prioris servitutis . . . com-
posuisse." But whether he had planned an Ab exitu liberae reipublicae from
the first or only later came to see that the crux of his problem was the
institution and nature of the principate, he never wrote the projected
work—unless it was lost before his histories were consolidated in a series
that began, as Jerome says, post Augustum.
(b) It would help, ifwe knew how many books the Historiae comprised,
and much ingenuity has been expended to determine whether there were
twelve, as required by the mystic doctrine of hexads, or fourteen, to make
with I-XVI the total of thirty mentioned by Jerome. We shall not
ponder that question, first, because the reading triginta in Jerome is not
7 The phrase is Mommsen's, in his edition of the paHmpsest of Livy, III-IV, Berolini,
1868, p. 208.
8 Carolus Bretschneider, Quo ordine ediderit Tacitus singulas Annalium partes, Argentorati,
1905, p. 74.
9 R.E.A., XXXIV (1932), pp. 139-158.
10 Fabia beheves that such a book was not written, because he is sure that Tacitus
would have preferred to stay within the sacred Hmits of hexads.
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certain,ii and second, because any attempt at accurate computation
would quickly lose itself in tenuous speculations. Tacitus was not writing
one of our comprehensive textbooks, which seek to "cover" all of a given
period and to allot to each event space proportional to its "over-all"
importance, as so many moderns believe. A first reading should make it
obvious that his subject is the principate, and that he writes with a full
awareness that all the events he mentions were within the compass of
other and well-known histories. 12 If Tacitus and Mommsen met in the
shadowy realm of Dis, the "most unmilitary of historians" laughed at
the solemn critic and told him to assuage his curiosity about the exact
position and movements of the armies at Bedriacum by reading Pompeius
Planta,i3 and to learn the military geography of Armenia from the
Commentarii of Corbulo. Tacitus' concern is to correct and explain, and
he allots space accordingly. Even so acute a scholar as Goodyear com-
plains that disproportionate attention is given to the mutinies on the
German frontier in the year 14, and imagines that the reason is rhetorical,
a desire to present "vivid and exciting scenes" with stylistic elaboration, i'*
11 No variant is shown in the apparatus of the new critical edition of Jerome's In
Zachariam by M. Adriaen ("Corpus Christianorum," Series Latina LXXVI-A, Turn-
holti, 1970), but the apparatus is obviously very selective, and even if the manuscripts
collated all have triginta or XXX, it would remain possible that Jerome wrote XXXV or
XXXX, the former being particularly exposed to corruption before voluminibus, or tres et
triginta, etc.
12 Including the last years of Domitian, if Tacitus did not "publish" the relevant
books until 107 or later, as is universally believed and seems quite probable. He was
certainly not the only man who felt an urge to write on that subject as soon as the ten-
sion and periclitation of Nerva's rule had been resolved by the adoption of Trajan;
there must have been many contemporaries who were eager to explain what they had
done or failed to do during the Terror, and others who wanted to exhibit their opinions.
One such historian is mentioned as quidam by Pliny, Ep. IX.27.1, a letter which will sug-
gest one possible reason for the long interval between Tacitus's decision to write and the
publication of his work: he deemed it kind or prudent to await the death of certain per-
sons whose actions he would have to explain, especially, perhaps, in connection with
the conspiracy that procured the assassination of Domitian. We could also imagine that
he waited to see what facts would be disclosed by other writers.
13 Of whom we know only from a scholium on Juvenal, II.99, for which see Wessner's
edition. It is unfortunate that Peter in his Historicorum Romanorum fragmenta quoted the
scholium in the form given it by Georgius Valla, who probably merely inferred that
Planta wrote after Tacitus from the earlier form of the scholium, in which the authors
are probably named in order of dignity. There is a good chance that this Planta is the
man whose death Pliny announces in Ep. IX. i, c. 107 or earlier.
1'* F. D. R. Goodyear in the first (and thus far only) volume of his truly excellent
edition of the Annales, Cambridge, 1972, pp. 29-31, discussing the "vast elaboration"
oi Ann. 1. 16-52.
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Those mutinies were the first occasion on which Roman armies in the
field tried to influence succession to the principate, and while it is true
that the mutinies had no great "historical effect" at the time, a litde more
ineptitude in dealing with them or sheer bad luck might have resulted
in a premature divulgation of the arcanum imperii. Tacitus's interest is in
studying the first manifestation of a tendency that was to have such dire
manifestations in later history to his own time and such calamitous
consequences thereafter, of which he may have in part apprehended
the danger. To calculate how long the Historiae were, we should first
have to know to what incidents Tacitus would see fit to devote two-fifths
of a book. The task is hopeless.
Although the numbering of the books in our manuscripts has been
imputed to that handy scape-goat, the Mediaeval scribe, is the extreme
improbability that anyone in the Middle Ages would think to combine
two distinct works or to alter the book-numbers shown in the colophons
of an exemplar, and the attested existence of a consolidated edition in
antiquity, make it only reasonable to suppose that our book-numbers
come from the surviving portion of a dismembered ancient codex. It is
on this basis that Walter Allen, Jr., believes that very substantial parts
of Tacitus's work, including the end of the Annates, were lost "when the
text was in the form of a volumen for each book and when each volumen
confronted its own destiny". i^ Only one tattered and incomplete set of
rolls remained when the works of Tacitus were first transcribed into a
codex around the middle of the Fifth Century. That this is possible, we
cannot deny. Tacitus was never a popular author: he demands in his
readers concentrated attention, a very high degree of intellectual power,
and, what is even rarer, the fortitude to face a world of unpleasant
realities instead of comforting oneself with hallucinogenic fairy tales or
drugs. Symmachus, who did so much to preserve civilization, never men-
tions him. In his darkling day, Tacitus might have given cold shivers of
foreboding to anyone who understood him, so we cannot argue that
Tacitus would have been preserved together with Livy. If we are not to
rest content with ignorance, we must try to weigh the relative proba-
bility of the alternative explanation, that Tacitus completed no more
than sixteen books of Annates.
15 Fabia {op. cit., p. 151) thinks that the last books of the Annates were lost before the
two works were combined, and that the first book of the Historiae was numbered XVII
because "le copiste de notre manuscrit [the Second Medicean!] ou d'un archetype . . .
a considere le seizieme livre incomplet des Annales comme le dernier."
16 T.A.P.A., CI (1970), p. 9. Jerome's reference (see note 3 supra) could, of course,
have been to a collection of rolls rather than a codex.
294 Illinois Classical Studies, II
We are first of all handicapped because we know nothing about his
methods of working. We do not know when he first resolved to write
history,!'^ nor do we know the compass of the work he then planned. We
do not know how many administrative positions he held besides a pro-
consulship, i^ how much of his time and energy was in various years
absorbed by official duties, political activities, social responsibilities, and
domestic cares, or what facilities or obstacles aided or hindered research
and composition when he was away from home—or, for that matter,
when he was at home. And worst of all, we do not know whether he
assembled and digested material for one segment of his work at a time
and remained with it until he produced a final draft of his text before
starting on the next segment, or whether he prepared his material for an
entire work, organized his treatment of it, and decided what he would
say on each subject before he began to write a literarily polished and
final text of any part.
When Tacitus wrote the Agricola, in or near January, 98, he had
planned at least the Historiae. If modern scholars are correct in refusing
to believe the younger Pliny's assertion that his letters were not arranged
in chronological order, Tacitus in 106 or 107 asked Pliny for some informa-
tion about the death of his uncle in 79. If eight years of labor had brought
him only to that year, he was certainly a slow worker, but, so far as we
know, his energies may have been engrossed by official duties in the
provinces or other activities until 105 or 106; or, on the other hand, his
request may have been an afterthought while revising a final draft of
books otherwise completed—or it may have been a mere courtesy to a
colleague eager to "help." About a year later, Pliny supplies information
about his own conduct in 93, thus providing proof that the Historiae
or the part of them that dealt with that year had not yet been made
public. 19
We do not know how Tacitus "published." Historians recited in his
1^ Gaston Bossier, in his Tacile, Paris, s.a. [1903], pp. 50 f., thinks it likely that Tacitus
prepared to write history as early as 93.
18 Of which we know only through the chance discovery of an inscription in Caria;
for the date of Tacitus's term as Proconsul of Asia, see A. I. Suskin, A.J.A., XL (1936),
pp. 71 f., and Syme's Appendix 23.
19 The proof, however, is subject to two obvious questions: (a) Pliny's letter is supposed
to be more or less contemporary with datable letters in the same book, but would Pliny
have "published" his letter before the part of the Historiae in which he hoped to be com-
mended was available to his readers? (b) Since it is unlikely that Tacitus devoted the
equivalent of a full Teubner page to Pliny's daring remark in the senate, could not
Pliny have put his letter into circulation to give his readers a fuller account of the incident
than they had found in Tacitus's already published work?
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day, but Pliny's silence may indicate that Tacitus was above such vanity. 20
Ingenuity has been lavished on efforts to prove that he "published" in
triads or hexads; one is reminded of Sherwin-White's comment anent
similar efforts with Pliny's letters: "The triad is a fantasy born of scholarly
hankering after system where system is improbable." 21 There are fairly
numerous allusions to contemporary events in almost every book of the
letters, but very few in the whole of Tacitus. There is no reason to sup-
pose that he would have followed the example of Vergil or of Propertius
or of Ovid, 22 and while we certainly cannot deny that he may have
"published" in triads or hexads or decades or dodecades, the internal
evidence that can be elicited by a microscopic search for discrepancies
is both so exiguous and so tenuous that we may be excused from affirming
that he followed any system. 23
20 Pliny had the good sense to be especially proud of his acquaintance with Tacitus.
What better way of advertising that relationship and paying his greater contemporary
fulsome compliments than a letter, perhaps to a third person, commenting on a recita-
tion by Tacitus, if such there had been ?
21 The Letters of Pliny, Oxford, 1966, p. 53.
22 As is well known, Ovid composed his long and intricate Metamorphoses and com-
pleted them (except for a few finishing touches) without "publishing" a single hexad,
pentad, triad, or book, and was able to pretend that he believed his own personal copy,
which he burned before going into exile, was the only copy in existence {Trist. I.7. 15-25).
For that procedure there can have been only one motive: he wanted his readers to have
the completed work in its entirety at one time. He doubtless felt that piecemeal "publica-
tion" would gravely detract from the effect of the whole, which attains a quasi-epic
sweep in the last book, and his artistic sense was certainly correct. If Ovid could master
what appears to have been a common Roman urge to rush before the public as soon as
a book or two was ready, Tacitus could have had equal self-control. Too much has been
made of the obvious fact that the peripeties of history are by their very nature dramatic
and often tragic, but Tacitus, who combined a profound historical sense with the highest
literary art, could well have thought of the Historiae as what they probably were, a con-
tinuous narrative rising from somber beginnings to a terrible climax and a catastrophe
in which blood-stained daggers, like a deus ex machina, suddenly resolved what had ap-
peared to be both unalterable and intolerable. If he did, he may have refused to destroy
that unity and blunt the emotional effect by giving out his work in pieces.
23 If there were hexads, then, obviously, the only place where a division would occur
in our extant text is after Book XII, where, to be sure, some indications have been found,
of which the most significant is the mention of Locusta in XIII. 15.3 as though she had
not already been identified in XII.62.3. In his commentary on I.54.1, however, Good-
year points out a discrepancy between that passage and II.95.1 that is fully as note-
worthy as any that "has been cited as evidence for lack of revision in the later books,"
and jusdy remarks that the comparison "encourages scepticism about the value of such
evidence." In fact, a common interpretation of the passage mentioned in note 29 infra
could be used to prove either that II.60 was published before II.61 or that Tacitus
never revised Book II.
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When it was believed that the Dialogus de oratoribus was a youthful
work, it was imagined that the author's style grew more "Tacitean" as
steadily as a tree grows year by year, until it reached full growth in the
last book of the Annates, so that intervals of time could be measured by a
process analogous to counting the rings in a tree's trunk. Fortunately,
we now need do no more than refer to two statistically precise and
trenchant articles, the one by Goodyear, who has shown that "stylistic
change is part of Tacitus' nature" and is neither uniform nor chrono-
logically measurable, and the other, which is virtually a corroborative
sequel, by J. N. Adams, who shows how many factors, conscious and
subconscious, may have contributed to the observed variations. ^'^
If Tacitus finished the Historiae in 109, as Syme suggests,25—and there
certainly is no reason to suggest a later date—he had about six years in
which to work on the Ab excessu divi Augusti before he completed the final
draft of Book II, and although he spent one of those years as Proconsul
of Asia26 (a position of high dignity but not necessarily one of onerous
duties), there is no known reason why that space of time should not have
sufficed him for the composition of all sixteen (or more) books of that
work, particularly if, as is possible and even likely, he had assembled
material for it even earlier. Livy wrote at the rate of at least three to four
books every year ; Cicero produced something like thirty books in a year,
aided, to be sure, by Greek treatises and his own recollections of the
studies of his youth,27 but apparently without materials previously col-
lected and digested in preparation for those writings. We do not know
how laborious was the brilliance and concision of Tacitus's Latin, but
even if his style required the most careful elaboration and reworking,
composition ofa final version from fully prepared materials would certainly
have been possible within a year, and the same space oftime would be more
than ample for all variations of stylistic habits found between Book I and
Book XVI . Let us accordingly consider the internal evidence without fitting
it to a Procrustean bed of preconceptions about how Tacitus "must" have
"pubhshed" or how his style "must" have "evolved."
There is one secure and certain indication of a fairly precise date: the
24 F. D. R. Goodyear, J.R.S., LVIII (1968), pp. 22-31; J. N. Adams, C.Q,., XXII
(1972), pp. 350-373-
25 Tacitus, pp. 1 18-120; cf. Appendix 21 on the chronology of PHny's letters.
26 112-113; see note 18 supra.
2' This makes the speed of composition somewhat less amazing. Cicero drew on his
early studies and subsequent thinking about philosophical questions as much as on the
Greek treatises, as was shown by Martin van den Bruwaene {La theologie de Ciceron,
Louvain, 1937), who, however, ventures too far in trying to identify "early" passages
in our texts.
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reference in II. 61. 2 to the Romanum imperium, "quod nunc Rubrum ad
Mare patescit".28 Despite a phenomenal expenditure of perverse ingenuity
in numerous attempts to explain away that passage, which in turn fixes
the scope of the more general reference to expansion of empire in IV.4.3,
the Rubrum Mare here is necessarily the Rubrum Mare of XIV. 2 5. 2, and
Tacitus patently refers to an epochal enlargement of the empire, not a trivial
rectification of frontiers. And since nunc means "now," Tacitus wrote that
passage after hearing the first news of Trajan's conquest of Mesopotamia in
1
1
5 and before that territory was abandoned by Hadrian soon after the
death of Trajan in August, 117. If we knew whether or not the passage was
a late addition to a substantially complete book,29 and if we knew what
method Tacitus followed in composing, we could venture further deduc-
tions, but as matters stand, we must be content with the limits 1 15-1 17, or,
if Hadrian successfully dissembled his intention for a time, iiS.^o
28 All that needs to be said on this subject is said by Koestermann, ad loc, and by Syme,
Appendix 71, with a postscript in his Ten Studies in Tacitus, Oxford, 1970, pp. 129, 144 f.
29 As Syme points out, the passage is the effective conclusion of a digression on Oriental
empires; he could have added that it seems to have a close rhetorical relationship to
11.60. 4, which has been the favorite datum of those who argue against the obvious meaning
of Mare Rubrum, and has also been taken to show that the reference to Trajan's conquests
was a kind of "stop-press" addition to a completed text. I think the passage may be
fairly paraphrased in its essentials as follows: In 772/19 the senior Egyptian priest at
Thebes translated for Germanicus hieroglyphic inscriptions which, he said, proved that
Rhamses had (i) conquered (a) Libya, now a Roman province, (b) the large territory
south of Egypt known as Aethiopia, which the Romans never seriously attempted to
occupy, and (c) the vast territories east of Asia Minor, Media, Persia, Bactria, and
Scythia, which even Alexander the Great had never completely subdued and into which
no Roman had ever led an army; (2) ruled all of Asia Minor, including the territories
that Trajan added to the Empire in 1 13-1 15; and (3) exacted from the lands subjected
to him a revenue equal to that which those lands now, in the year 869/1 16, pay to their
present masters, who are either the Parthians or the Romans. There is nothing in that
passage that need conflict with what is said a little later about the Rubrum Mare, for while
Trajan captured the capital, Ctesiphon, and annexed the western fringe of Parthian
territory, he never claimed to have taken Susa or Ecbatana, or to have penetrated into
the Parthian heartland, Persis and Media, which therefore was still subject to Parthian
rule, i.e., to Osroes, who, we may be sure, did not forget to collect taxes. It seems to me,
therefore, that nunc in the two passages may refer to the same date and without the
slightest inconsistency. The extension of Roman rule to the Persian Gulf by occupation
of Mesopotamia did not at all imply that the whole of Parthia had been annihilated or
subjugated, and, despite some odd assumptions by modern scholars, no one in Tacitus's
day would have supposed that it did.
30 So Syme believes, but Hadrian's intentions would doubtless have become known
to well-informed Romans before they were carried into effect, and the date of the formal
abolition of the new provinces is conjectvu-al, as is the guess that Hadrian may have
entered into some sort of "face-saving" treaty with the Parthians.
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In what is preserved of the remaining books of the Annates, there is no
definite allusion to a later event,3i and therefore nothing to invalidate
Mendell's conclusion that the whole of that work was made public by
Tacitus in 116. We can a little simplify our inquiry by strictly limiting
it to the date at which the extant text was written, since we really know
nothing about the circumstances of its publication. ^2 Lacking positive
information, we are reduced to the ever parlous expedient of seeking
negative evidence.
With no author are arguments ex silentio more precarious than with
Tacitus; and that is not merely because so much of his history has been
lost. He wrote with such restraint and subtlety that he thoroughly con-
fused Von P6hlmann,33 and he always disconcerts readers who have not
reached the intellectual maturity that Renan attained when he wrote,
"je me resignai a un etat de la creation ou beaucoup de mal sert de
condition a un peu de bien."^^ We are often tempted to assume that so
powerful a mind must have foreseen—and foreseen as inevitable—the dis-
integration of the empire and the barbarian invasions; it requires con-
stant vigilance to keep our understanding of him untainted by the
endemic superstitions and epidemic delusions of our darkling age. There
is, even now, incessant argument about his opinions on every subject.
// nous faut trancher les discussions. I can address only those who will agree
that his primary concern was preservation of the Imperium Romanum;
that he believed that the empire, urgentibus fatis,^^ was under the neces-
31 Syme suggests (especially pp. 517-519) that experience of the early years of Hadrian's
rule may have colored Tacitus's portraits of Nero and perhaps even Tiberius.
Koestermann, Athenaeum, XLIII (1965), pp. 206 ff., believes that the description of the
judicial murder of Thrasea Paetus was colored by Hadrian's assassinations. Such con-
jectures are insubstantial; history repeats itself, and thoughtful men disapprove in the
past what they would resent in the present. One could argue that Hist. IV.41.1 reflects
Hadrian's belated oath to the Senate that he would not have senators murdered inform-
ally!
32 Koestermann, in his commentary, Vol. IV, p. 10, says of the later books, "Dabei
bliebe die Frage offen, wann diese Biicher iiberhaupt aus seinem NachlaB ediert worden
sind." For aught that we know to the contrary, that could have been true of the Annates
as a whole. We have no evidence that they did not, like the historical work of Seneca's
father (though perhaps for a different reason), remain 'unpublished' for years after the
author's death.
33 Die Weltanschauung des Tacitus, Miinchen, 191 3, leaves one with the conclusion that
Tacitus either had no settled opinions or did not see that some of his opinions were
incompatible with others!
3^ In the preface to the publication in 1890 of his juvenile L'Avenir de la science.
35 The controversy over the meaning of this phrase is simply phenomenal. If one
has an irresistible urge to make Tacitus prophesy the coming of Alaric, WolfRin's emenda-
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sity
—
perhaps a fatal necessity—of expanding its dominion by subduing
the barbarians on its borders, and that the worst princeps was one who
was incuriosus proferendi imperii; and that, furthermore, as liro Kajanto
has reminded us in an excellent article that he could have carried far-
ther,36 Tacitus believed that war was itself a moral purgative indispensable
to the empire. When Rome was little more than a city, L. Quinctius (as
reported by Livy, III. 19. 12), with the Roman capacity for facing facts,
had observed, "Nescio quo fato magis bellantes quam pacati propitios
habemus deos." Under the empire, as experience had repeatedly proved,
there was a further consideration: the standing armies that were neces-
sary for defence of the frontiers were, under competent commanders,
an irresistible offensive force, but when they, like the aristocracy, became
longa pace desides, the result was sedition and civil war. The army, like
fire, was an indispensable servant but a fearful master, and the way to
keep it under control was to employ it on the tasks for which it had been
created. However painful so horrid a thought may be to tender souls,
Tacitus was certain that the saeculum inaugurated by Trajan would be
beatissimum because, inter alia, the bungling defensive policies of the past
would be replaced by the offensive operations which alone can succeed
against a persistent enemy.
tion or Koestermann's will serve his purpose, and some such meaning could be extracted
from Robinson's in spite of Robinson's own interpretation of his reading, but if there
was ever an excuse for misunderstanding urgentibus, that excuse was based on ignorance
of the parallel passages that are conveniently listed by Gudeman ad loc. {Germ. 33) in
his second edition of the Agricola and Germania (Boston, 1928). Tacitus's meaning was
ably demonstrated by Herbert W. Benario, Historia, XVir(i968), pp. 37-50; his con-
clusions are not in the least impaired by the subsequent article by Konrad Kraft, Hermes,
XCVI (1969), pp. 591-608.
^6 Latomus, XXIX (1970), pp. 699-718. On the politically and socially demoralizing
influence of peace, cf Oswald Spengler, Jahre der Entscheidmg, Munchen, 1933, p. 10:
"Einen langen Krieg ertragen wenige, ohne seelisch zu verderben; einen langen Frieden
ertragt niemand." Aristotle's theory {Pol. 1334a) that the deleterious effects of peace
could be obviated by wise legislation (assuming that the nomothete had the power to
impose his wisdom on the populace) was applicable only to city-states; in the Roman
Empire, such legislation was no longer possible, and peace within the empire could be
broken only by the far greater evil of civil war, but the vigor and virility of the ruling
class could be maintained by the wars along the frontiers that were in any case necessary
to preserve and augment the Empire and to maintain the discipline and efficiency of
the standing armies. Tacitus, no doubt, thought primarily in terms of the historical
imperative inherent in the very fact of empire, and we should not forget that his belief
that Agricola should have been permitted to complete the conquest of Britain and then
go on to annex Ireland was confirmed by subsequent history: after the futility ofHadrian's
Chinese Wall had been repeatedly and expensively demonstrated, Septimus Severus
had to make a belated effort to carry out Agricola's plan.
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When he wrote II.61.2, Tacitus believed that Mesopotamia had be-
come a province like Libya, and while the Parthians had not been sub-
dued, he doubtless thought that their power had been permanently
broken by the loss of their capital city, and that their kingdom would
slowly disintegrate by internal convulsions aided by further Roman
thrusts at opportune moments. He may even have hoped, as did Trajan
in the full tide of victory, that the legions would one day march in India.
Given his conception of imperial destiny, and his belief that the Parthians
were a menace comparable to the Germans, 37 we can imagine the dis-
appointment and distress that he would have felt at news of the reverses
Trajan suffered before he started home in August, 1 1 7, and what would
have been his anger—and perhaps despair—over a shameful and cowardly
retreat and a contraction of the territory within which, ominously, it
would thenceforth be angustius imperitatum. Now in Books XI to XV
Tacitus has often to mention the affairs of Armenia and Parthia, and he
devotes considerable space to them, especially to the career of Domitius
Corbulo, and in all of this there is no allusion to the abandonment of
Trajan's conquest, nor even a turn of phrase that would suggest such
knowledge. Had he known of the failure, could he have refrained from
at least some allusive phrase, such as pewicaces Romanorum hostes or num-
quam diu domiti or sempiterno imperio nostra periculo nati? I can discover
nothing in those books inconsistent with an hypothesis that Tacitus re-
garded the Parthian problem as satisfactorily on its way to a definitive
solution, and I note that the words he puts into the mouths of recreants
in XV. 1 3.2, "<(neque> eandem vim Samnitibus . . . ac Parthis, Romani
imperii aemulis," would be exquisitely ironical, if the rivals of the great
empire were going the way of the rivals of the early city-state.
If a second and equally tenuous inference ex silentio is valid, we can
lower the limit ante quern. The date of the simultaneous outbreak of the
Jews in many parts of the empire is variously reported. Jerome says that
it began in 115,38 but it is inconceivable that Trajan, no matter how
37 He admits, Germ. 37, "regno Arsacis acrior est Germanorum Hbertas," but he lists
the Parthians after the Samnites, the Carthaginians, the Celtiberians, and the Gauls
—
all problems that the Romans had successfully solved, with the implication that a solu-
tion of the Parthian problem was long overdue. If Tacitus perceived at all what later
history makes so obvious to us, the danger of including in Roman territory an ever
increasing number of unassimilable barbarians, he must have assumed either that they
could be kept in permanent subjection or that the risk was less than that of permitting
them to remain under arms and uncontrolled outside the frontiers. We may wish that
we had the eloquent chapter that he must have devoted to Domitian's shameful peace
with the Dacians.
38 In Fotheringham's edition of the Chronici canones, Londinii, 1923, p. 278. The
beginning of the outbreak is accordingly placed in 115 by R. P. Longden {Cambridge
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intent on Oriental conquests he may have been, would have ignored for
two years the devastation and effective loss to the empire of whole
provinces, including Egypt with its indispensable granaries. Our best
source, Cassius Dio, places the beginning of the great insurrection in the
spring of 1
1
7.39 That date for what amounted to a frenzied attempt to
destroy the Roman Empire and forced Trajan to detach part of his army
Ancient History, Vol. XI, p. 250) and many others. On the discrepancy between this
date and the dates in Eusebius's Historia ecclesiastica, see the article by Miss Motta, cited
infra, n. 39. That the outbreak occurred simultaneously in several provinces is attested
by all our sources, and is only reasonable, whether we suppose it to have spread by con-
tagious enthusiasm or to have been prearranged and concerted according to an 'over-all'
strategic plan. The eminent Jewish historian, Heinrich Graetz, in his Geschichte der Juden,
4. Auflage bearbeitet von S. Horovitz, Leipzig, 1908, Vol. IV, p. 113, says that the Jews,
after inciting and leading the revolts in Mesopotamia, "verbreiteten den Aufstand iiber
einen groBen Teil des romischen Reiches. . . . Eine solche Einmiitigkeit setzt einen
wohlberechneten Plan und kraftigen Fiihrer voraus." Miss Motta (p. 487, n. i) cites
an article by A. Friedmann (to which I do not have access) in which it is concluded that
the outbreaks in the Roman Empire were engineered from Palestine; I suppose that the
chief of the race {Nasi, 'ethnarch') is meant. Offhand, one could conjecture that if there
was a world-wide strategy, the direction came from the Prince {Resch Golah, 'exilarch'),
who, according to Graetz (p. 112) had authority over all the Jews in the empire, and
who normally resided in Babylon; no one seems to know whether he feigned submission
to the Roman occupation of that city or fled into Parthian territory. Graetz points out
that Roman control of Mesopotamia would have gravely impaired the commercial
ascendency of the Jews, and one can only say that if the coordination of the revolt in
Mesopotamia with wide-spread insurrection within the empire to take Trajan a tergo
was planned, it was masterly strategy and successful. Alexander Fuks {infra, n. 40)
believes that the coordinated outbreaks in Cyprus, Cyrenaica, and Egypt, at least, had
no "tangible, rational cause" and were merely "rooted in the messianic yearnings of the
Jews." We are, of course, here interested only in the chronology (cf. infra, n. 40).
39 Strictly speaking, what Dio implies (LXVIII.32.1) is that the news of the overthrow
of Roman government in Cyrenaica, Egypt, and Cyprus reached Trajan while he was
engaged in the siege of Hatra. (One could conjecture that his anger and alarm caused
the tactical blunder of which Syme, p. 495, very plausibly accuses him.) On the chron-
ology, see the study by Lelia Motta, Aegyptus, XXXII (1952), pp. 474-490, whose lucid
and critical analysis of all the evidence (except certain papyri adduced by Fuks; see my
next note) leads her to place the beginning of the sudden outbreak in the Roman pro-
vinces in the "prima meta del 117 d.C." We may add that although Trajan despatched
Marcius Turbo with adequate forces to Egypt and doubtless sent other commanders
and troops to other regions, the insurrection was not suppressed at the time of his death,
which may, indeed, have contributed to the subsequent pacification. He left Mesopotamia
after arranging a temporary cessation of hostilities, and intended to return (Dio, LXVIII.
33.1 : napeoKevd^eTO /xev avdig eV MeaoTrora/itW oTparevaai.) , doubtless after he had restored
Roman rule, begun reconstruction of the demolished cities, and taken precautions to
avert similar outbreaks in the future. This supports Miss Motta's conclusion, for a much
earlier date would mean either that Trajan simply ignored a vast and terrible insurrec-
tion for a year or more, or that it took legionary troops an improbably long time to break
resistance in territory in which there were no mountain fastnesses to be stormed or starved.
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in Mesopotamia, as distinct from relatively minor and local disturbances
that may have occurred earlier, must be approximately correct. '^o The
ferocity of the zealots, the atrocity of the tortures they inflicted on their
victims, the gruesome mutilation of corpses, the extermination of Romans,
Greeks, and even natives in prosperous and populous regions of the
empire, the slaughter of Roman officials,''^ and the levelling of great
cities to the ground,'*^ made that outbreak surpass in horror any of Rome's
civil wars, and the horror as well as the menace to the very existence
"W Alexander Fuks, in his excellent article, J.R.S., LI (1961), pp. 98-104, which
complements his detailed study of the papyrological evidence in Aeg^'ptus, XXXIII
(1953)5 PP- 131-1585 returns to the date of 115 on the basis of one crucial piece of evi-
dence (since the other, the Acta Pauli et Antonini, is now securely dated to the reign of
Hadrian: Musurillo, Acts, p. 181), a mutilated papyrus containing the proclamation of
a nameless Prefect of Alexandria in the nineteenth year of somebody's reign. One could
question Fuks' equation of that nineteenth year with 115, but if we accept it, I submit
that a careful reading of the text (most recently edited by Fuks, Corpus papyrorum ludaicarum,
Jerusalem, 1957, #435) vvill show that it cannot refer to the great outbreak that alone
concerns us. Enough of the text remains to show clearly that, as Fuks himself says, the
Prefect, writing on 13 October, regards the troubles as over and thinks only of reestablish-
ing domestic peace in the city, which he evidently hopes that a stern admonition to
trouble-makers will suffice to produce. It is utterly unbelievable that any Roman prefect
could have written in such complacent terms after the Jews in Cyrenaica had, according
to Fuks, devoted themselves to "annihilation of the pagans" with such efficiency that
they left only "scorched earth behind" when they invaded Egypt to join the insurrection-
ists there. If the date is 115, then the Prefect wrote after one of the usual staseis in Alexan-
dria had been put down and before the great insurrection in Egypt and elsewhere, of
which he knows nothing. The only objection is that such a local and separate outbreak
does not fit the theory of a strategically planned and coordinated insurrection to support
a revolt in Mesopotamia {supra, n. 38), but that obviously is not insuperable. If the
Prefect's proclamation is evidence of an outbreak in Alexandria in the summer or early
autumn of 1 15, which had to be suppressed by the available Roman troops in what he
calls a iiaxq, that explains the date in Jerome, for Eusebius could have regarded the
event as a harbinger or preliminary of the great outbreak in Egypt and other provinces.
Alexandria was a city in which riots approaching the fury of a civil war (Claudius calls
one of them a TrdAe/xos in P. Lond. 191 2, /. 74) occurred naturally and with monotonous
regularity, and the tumultus mentioned in the papyrus would have been regarded as
merely normal by Trajan (and Tacitus).
"*! Appian, who was evidently a minor official in the bureaucracy in Egypt, escaped
the Jews, as he tells us (frag. 19 Viereck & Roos), by extraordinary good luck, but many
other officials in the Roman administration, perhaps including procurators, cannot have
been so fortunate.
^^2 In Gyrene, for example, the destruction of the city was virtually total; see the
inscriptions collected by S. Applebaum, J.R.S., XL (1950), pp. 87-90, and the accom-
panying article. This substantiates reports of total devastation elsewhere. On the "scorched
earth" policy, see the articles by Fuks cited above.
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of the empire, of which a fatal weakness was thus disclosed,'*^ must have
made a profound impression on all contemporaries, and especially on
Tacitus, who could scarcely have refrained from alluding to it, had it
occurred before he wrote. Unfortunately for our purposes, however, his
text has been lost at the points at which such an allusion would most
naturally have occurred: the riots in Alexandria in 38, the violence and
agitation of 41 that occasioned Claudius's letter and edict of warning,
the sedition of Theudas, c. 46, and especially the outbreak in Rome
impulsore Chresto.^ We are left with the uncertain evidence of the famous
passage in XV. 44. 3 concerning the Chrestiani, who, as Koestermann has
shown, '*5 must have been followers of the revolutionary agitator, Chrestus,
and who formed a religious sect that Tacitus identifies with the sect
that makes its first appearance in history in Pliny's famous letter of
'*3 At the time that Hadrian seized power, according to Spartianus (5.2), in addition
to yet unsubdued insurrections in the territories in which we know the Jews to have been
active, "Mauri lacessebant [i.e., in Mauretania; cf. 5.8], Sarmatae bellum inferebant
[in Dacia, thus providing Hadrian with a pretext for his reported wish to abandon that
province also?], Brittani teneri sub Romana dicione non poterant." We may beUeve
that there were serious troubles in the regions named, but we mtist allow for the possi-
bilit)' that the source is Hadrian's autobiography, in which he would certainly have
exaggerated their gravity to the very limit of credibility. If we follow Graetz and others
in thinking of a carefully planned and coordinated effort to shatter the Roman Empire,
the uprisings in these (and probably other) regions could have been the work of the
large Jewish colonies in cities throughout the empire, who would naturally have insti-
gated and used the natives wherever possible; if, on the other hand, they were spontaneous
native movements, their leaders must have been inspired, and emboldened by reports
of the Jews' successes in Eg>-pt, C\Tenaica, C>'prus, and perhaps elsewhere. What those
successes proved was that Roman rule was not proof against a sudden and furious revolt
by a segment of the population in a time of apparent tranquillity, and the example thus
set may have influenced later revolts within the empire to an extent we cannot estimate.
** The date of the riots mentioned by Suetonius {Claud. 25.4) is imcertain. It seems
unlikely that Tacitus would have ignored an outbreak in Rome of such magnitude that
it called for rather drastic action by Claudius (no doubt accompanied by a pedantic
discourse or other characteristic conduct), and he could have mentioned the riots with-
out naming Chrestos or even have named the agitator without tracing the origin of the
seditious sect to an earlier revolutionary of the same or similar name and thus antici-
pating what he says here. Our extant text begins near the middle of Book XI and after
the early months of 47; there is no indication of a considerable lacuna in Book XII; and
it is unlikely that Tacitus would have mentioned in the lost part of XI or a preceding
book a noteworthy incident that occurred two or more years later. Given the possibility
that Tacitus did mention the riots of which Chrestus was the instigator, the date 49,
commonly assigned to them on very tenuous evidence, must be regarded as doubtful.
*^ Historia, XVI (1967), pp. 456-469; cf. his commentary ad loc.
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c. 112.'*^ Whatever the basis for the identification, Tacitus clearly thinks
of the exitiabilis superstitio as a sect of Jewish nihilists, a pestilence that
began in Judaea and spread to Jewish colonies throughout the western
world, especially the numerous colony at Rome, and his "etiam per
Vrbem" sounds like an allusion to the outbreak instigated by Chrestus.
Had he known of the enormously more deadly and devastating eruption
of Messianic aspirations in 117, would he have contented himself with an
allusion to a relatively minor outbreak at Rome that the government had
quickly brought under control? I think it unlikely that he would. With-
out pretending to know what he said in the lost books,'''' I think the most
probable of the several possible explanations of his silence at this point
is that he wrote before the insurrection began. That would place the
composition of Book XV, and presumably of XVI also, in 11 5-1 16.
Tacitus was sixty or past sixty in 116. He had reached the point in
life at which every man, if not thoughtless, must say to himself, with
Lucilius, "iam, qua tempestate vivo, chresin ad me recipio." All the ills
that flesh is heir to begin to accumulate by a physiological necessity
46 In La Parola del Passato, XXIII (1968), pp. 368-370, Robert Renehan (who had
not seen Koestermann's article) argues that Chrestiani should be read not only in Tacitus
but also in Pliny; he does not consider Suetonius, JVero, 16.2, or make clear his view of
the quotation from Sulpicius Severus that is now printed as Frag. 2 of the Historiae,
although the mention of Christiani, if not the entire passage, is more probably to be
attributed to the Fifth-Century Christian writer than to Tacitus. Leon Herrmann,
Latomus, XIII (1954), pp. 343-353, contends that Pliny's letter has been grossly, though
very cleverly, interpolated ; if he is right, then the sectaries whom Pliny found in Bithynia
need not have been persons whom the Christians of later centuries would have been
willing to accept as spiritual progenitors. It would be irrelevant to consider here ques-
tions that have been endlessly debated with much emotion and little objectivity, and it
will suffice to remark that (i) it is psychologically improbable that the appalling malevo-
lence manifest in the Apocalypse and innumerable similar compositions could have been
satisfied by dreams of universal catastrophe and suffering that it made no attempt to
realize, and (2) nothing is more preposterous than the notion that the eminently practical
Romans, long accustomed to tolerate the most outlandish sects and the weirdest super-
stitions, attributed odium generis humani to an innocuous flock of innocent lambs that were
uniquely engaged in loving one another.
^"^ Or what he may have planned to say when he came to the Jewish revolt in 66,
where, as Syme suggests (p. 469, n. 2), his probably numerous earlier mentions ofJewish
seditions could have been brought to an artistically perfect climax, which, we may add,
need not have involved much repetition of what he had said in Hist. V.2-8. I recognize
that the possibility he might have deferred to that point the allusion that I desiderate in
XV.44 seriously weakens an argument ex silentio on which I should otherwise insist more
strongly, but it is also possible that in the chapter now lost (if ever written) Tacitus
maintained the attitude he took in the Historiae, where he speaks of the Jews ofJudaea
without reference to the Jews dispersed throughout the Roman Empire, where their
status was, of course, entirely different.
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against which consolatory essays de senectute are powerless, and although a
few men who are by heredity fMaKpo^iot wither slowly, no one is astonished
when men of that age cease to live. Tacitus may have died in the course
of nature after he completed (or even before he completed) Book XVI;
his great German expositor suggests, "Vielleicht hat ihm der Tod (wie
Petrarca) den Griffel aus der Hand genommen."48 Koestermann was
thinking of a later date, but I see no reason why Tacitus may not have
died before he heard of the Jewish outbreak or suspected that the empire
had passed the noon of all its greatness—died with an unshaken faith in
Rome, felix opportunitate mortis.
There are, however, two alternatives (aside from the obvious one, a
physical collapse) that are worth mentioning. I shall do no more than
sketch possibilities that no amount of argument could convert into cer-
tainties.
Tacitus was undoubtedly a man of considerable, and conceivably
great, influence in the politics of Rome and the Roman Empire. From an
inscription discovered by chance in 1889 we have learned that he held
the proconsulship that was the highest honor to which a loyal senator
could aspire,^^ but we do not know how prominent a part he took in the
business of the senate nor to what extent he was an intimate friend of the
princeps ; we do not even know whether he was a member of the consilium
that Trajan appears to have scrupulously consulted. He had some part in
the rise of Trajan to the principate; how great a part is conjectural. In
the Agricola (44.5) he says of his father-in-law: "ei <non licuit) durare
in hanc beatissimi saeculi lucem ac principem Traianum videre, quod
augurio votisque apud nostras aures ominabatur." Now this is generally
taken to be merely a rhetorical device, a "happy artifice," so and to
mean no more than that Agricola hoped for better times. But an augurium
should be more specific, and ominari means more than to wish or hope.
When Agricola confided in his son-in-law (necessarily before 89, when
Tacitus left Italy), Flavius Clemens was still alive and his sons were the
officially designated heirs, and while anyone could have hoped that
pupils of Quintilian would be imbued with humanitas, there was no
assurance that Quintilian was a better teacher than Seneca. What is
more, if we take Tacitus literally, Agricola predicted the accession of
Trajan, who, to be sure, was a man of some distinction, son of a military
man who had been transformed into a patrician; he had been a praetor,
48 Vol. IV, p. 410.
49 It is not impossible that we may someday learn from newly discovered fragments of
the Fasti that he held a second consulship.
50 Syme, p. 29.
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had commanded a legion in Spain, and had given proof of military com-
petence in handling troops, but it would have required praeterhuman
prescience to foresee that he would have a chance to become princeps.
It is by no means impossible, however, that Agricola, one of the very few
men of extraordinary ability whom Tacitus judged capax imperii, had,
with a few of his peers, selected Trajan as Domitian's successor. Prudent
men would not plan a futile revolt, such as that of Saturninus, nor yet
an assassination when there were no special circumstances to make it
feasible, but men capable of keeping their own counsel patiently could
have made discreet preparations to take advantage of the opportunity
that would present itself when the fortunately childless Domitian was
removed from the scene. If that was what Agricola confided to the ears
of his son-in-law and heir, ominabatur has a real meaning—and Tacitus
was his successor in the conspiracy. ^^
It is generally agreed that Cocceius Nerva was probably a participant
in the conspiracy that delivered Rome from Domitian, although he was
in the end unable to protect the actual assassins from the Praetorians.
At all events, the accession of so aged and feeble a man was merely a
stop-gap; as Syme puts it, "it meant that the struggle for the succession
could begin at once." If a small group of prudent men had already
resolved that Trajan was to be the successor, they probably were not
members of the conspiracy that disposed of Domitian, but they seized
an opportunity that presented itself, perhaps unexpectedly, and it is
quite likely that, as Syme suggests, the adoption of Trajan was forced on
Nerva,52 which means that it was likewise forced on the senators and
51 As we all know, great political mutations, when not the result of war, are normally
brought about by conspiracies, although it is customary to use euphemisms when speak-
ing of successful conspiracies of which one approves, and prudence may require further
circumlocution when the prevailing mythology attributes such changes to supernatural
beings or "spontaneous" action by a populace or proletariat.
52 Dietmar Kienast, Historia, XVII (1968), pp. 51-71, has pointed out that Pliny in
his Panegyricus speaks of Nerva in terms that are less than flattering, as surely Pliny would
not and could not have done, had Trajan felt any real gratitude, much less pietas, toward
his adoptive father. Pliny doubtless had good opportunities to learn after the event how
the transfer of power was effected, and Kienast would have done well to explore the
basis of Pliny's thrice-repeated certainty that Trajan was a man quem constat imperaturum
fuisse, etiamsi a Nerva non esset adoptatus. Pliny, speaking in public, naturally speaks of the
need to save the empire and implies that Trajan came to power divinitus, but Pliny had
had some little experience of human affairs, and unless he was indulging in empty
rhetoric or had the temerity to suggest that Trajan would have followed the example of
Vitellius, he must have known that Trajan and his champions at Rome had made their
preparations with such sagacity and thoroughness that they were in a position to impose
their will on Nerva and the opposing factions.
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other men of influence who favored other candidates. Now, whether or
not there was a group already resolved and prepared to act for Trajan,
as we have conjectured, Tacitus was undoubtedly a member of the group
that procured Trajan's succession. 53 Trajan was therefore to some extent
politically indebted to Tacitus, and Tacitus was wholly committed to
Trajan, not only politically but from an inner conviction that must have
been based on a knowledge of Trajan's character such as could have
come only from a long acquaintance or friendship.54
That Tacitus was disappointed in Trajan's rule goes without saying:
every man who anticipates a beatissimum saeculum must necessarily dis-
cover that, no matter how hard he tried to be coolly rational, his imagina-
tion got the better of his judgement, leading him to expect from a political
mutation impossible results. Even if he has kept his mind unclouded by
the normal illusion that a change in regime will transform human nature,
he will find that his conceptions of what is desirable and feasible conflict
with the calculations of other influential men, that decisions must be
made in terms of events and pressures that he did not foresee, and that,
in short, "between the idea and the reality falls the Shadow." The only
question will be how far he is willing to compromise.
We cannot catalogue Tacitus's disappointments. We may be sure that
he disapproved strongly of Plotina's ingerence in political affairs, at least
after she, like Messalina, presumed to sit in the consilium principis,^^ and he
53 As Syme has pointed out, it is quite possible that Tacitus held the consulship when
Nerva finally adopted Trajan. This has been denied by Harold B. Mattingly in a boldly
prosopographical article {Rivista storica delVAntichita, II (1972), pp. 169-185) that raises
questions that I hope to discuss elsewhere. Whatever the date of the consulship, Ogilvie
is surely right in saying (in his and Richmond's edition of the Agricola, p. 9) that Tacitus
"must have participated, whether as consul or ex-consul, in the political crisis that
resulted in the adoption of Trajan."
54 The crowd is naturally eager to endow with imaginary virtues new rulers of whom
it knows nothing, but Tacitus must early have acquired the unusual ability or fortitude
to observe human nature objectively, and we cannot suppose that his confidence in
Trajan's will and ability to inaugurate a new era was based on mere gossip or a nodding
acquaintance. Whether he was well acquainted with Plotina (who was younger, and
may have been very much younger, than her husband) is, of course, quite another
question.
55 Attested by P. Oxy. 1242 { = Acta Hermaisci in the Acta Alexandrinorum) , where her
presence would have been specifically protested, had it not been usual and taken for
granted. The unknown author doubtless colored his narrative to further his purposes,
but he would have been at pains to avoid obvious blunders in describing the setting. The
doubts about his accuracy expressed by H. A. Musurillo in his commentary {The Acts
of the Pagan Martyrs, Oxford, 1954, p. 176) depend on the assumption that the author
used avyKXtjTiKol in the special sense of "Roman senators" rather than in the general
and normal meaning of the word, which simply designates the members of any group
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may have been dismayed when she finally obtained from her indulgent
husband the title and rank of Augusta, as Agrippina had done. He must
have bitterly resented the presence and offices of her favorite, Aelius
Hadrianus, a sleek young man of dubious antecedents and of morals
that probably left no room for doubt, a Graeculus, master of all arts of
which he had obtained a smattering, and actually a master of the art
by which ambitious young men generally acquire influence over older
men who have sexually unsatisfied wives. ^6 Although Tacitus cannot have
foreseen what would eventually happen, for there are limits to the powers
of the coniectura consequentium, non multum a divinatione differens, he was
doubtless worried when Plotina contrived a marriage between her
favorite and lulia Sabina, her husband's grand-niece. It is possible,
though improbable, that he resented the influence of Jews in Trajan's
court. ^"^ We cannot even guess whether Tacitus approved of the alimentary
institutions as a means of preserving the native stock or regarded them
and other expensive benefactions as a waste of money. Philostratus ob-
viously catered to the credulity of his wonder-loving age when he de-
scribed Trajan's affection and admiration for Dio Chrysostom,58 but it
seems that Trajan did show some favor to the house-broken Cynic, and
he may have been really interested in Chrysostom's scheme for resettling
urban proletariats in agrarian countrysides. 59 Tacitus may have been
sceptical of the plan and almost certainly disapproved of its promoter.
that has been called together to deliberate or give advice, and is thus applicable to the
consilium principis, which, as Musurillo says, probably included influential equites as well
as senators.
56 Victorians were sure that Plotina, to whom some nice sayings are attributed, was
a lady, and that ladies are incapable of marital divagations. Our contemporaries, who
take for granted Pope's dictum that "every woman is at heart a rake", will be especially
moved by the report (Dio, LXVIII.7, says that Trajan nepl /xeipa/cia eWouSa/cet) that
poor Plotina needed what is now called "an outlet."
57 In Ann. XV. 27. 3 he identifies Tib. lulius Alexander as an "illustris eques Romanus,"
obviously regarding him as a Roman by "assimilation," and it is likely that he took the
same attitude toward many or all of the Jews in positions of prominence and power in
Rome, who must necessarily have exhibited all the essentials of Graeco-Roman culture.
Syme's note (p. 468, n. 2) is therefore misleading: it is Josephus, not Tacitus, who identi-
fies as Jews several persons mentioned in the Historiae and Annales.
58 Vit. soph. 1.7.4; cf G. W. Bowersock, Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire, Oxford,
1969, p. 47, and Donald R. Dudley, A History of Cynicism, London, 1937, p. 154, who
(following J. von Arnim) remarks that there were "good reasons why . . . Trajan should
have found Dio highly useful."
59 Or. VII (BujSol'KO? = 13 in von Arnim's edition) § 107; avayKuaO-qaoiieda eK^aXelv eV
Tcov TToXecov TOJ Xoyo) Toiis KoixiJ/oiis rrevrfras, tva Trapixcj^ev ru) ovri Kad' 'O/XTjpov raj iroXeis
ev vaieraayaas, k.t.X. Dudley {op. cit., pp. 157 f.) takes this to be a serious proposal for social
reform, and so do I, although it is hard to feel certain that any passage in the vast verbiage
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We could multiply instances of policies that Tacitus is unlikely to have
endorsed, and it would be possible to imagine that he was gradually
alienated from Trajan,60 but the real question is whether all of Trajan's
shortcomings, multiply them as we will, would have outweighed in
Tacitus's estimation Trajan's success in overawing the Germans, con-
quering Dacia, and extending Roman dominion to the Caucasus, the
Caspian Sea, and the Persian Gulf—all this while preserving, at least
in the part of society that Tacitus thought important, the felicitas tem-
porum "ubi sentire quae velis et quae sentias dicere licet." Intelligent
men understand that politics is the art of the possible, and Tacitus knew
that nations that have won empire invariably find themselves riding a
tiger from which it would be suicide to dismount. He need not have
thought Trajan an optimus princeps, so long as he thought him optimus
principum. And unless we imagine him as having gone into a disgruntled
or despondent retirement, as he and Trajan grew old together, he must
have been increasingly concerned with the problem of how power was
again to be transmitted to worthy hands.^i And if he did survive Trajan,
of the "Second Sophistic" is not merely epideictic. Dio professes a practical political
purpose (§127: €1 Se ttoXXu twv eipr]fj,ev(av KadoXov xp-qaifia iari npos noXiTelav k.t.X.), but
that, of course, could be part of the show. Dudley credits him with important additional
proposals that have been lost in the transmission of the text.
^ Alain Michel, in his Tacite et le destin de VEmpire (Paris, 1966), a discursive book
addressed to readers ignorant of the Classics but well worth reading, depicts Tacitus as
progressively alienated from Trajan's government and reaching a kind of spiritual and
intellectual isolation in his later years. One could also base inferences on the modern
view that Trajan in his last years became a "megalomaniac" who "overstrained the
resources of the empire" in a "fantastic" scheme of conquest; the only evidence for this
is the assumption that Hadrian consulted the interests of the nation rather than his
personal convenience or advantage. To be sure, there was a limit to expansion eastward
—oiu- mind boggles at the idea of Rome with a boundary on the China Sea—but Tacitus
evidently did not believe that the limit had been reached, nor, for that matter, did the
authors of the tradition that came down to Eutropius, who is so certain that the retreat
was imnecessary that he gives a naive explanation of Hadrian's motive ("Traiani gloriae
invidens").
61 It would be vain to discuss ancient rumors about whom Trajan would have nomi-
nated as his successor, or to speculate about why the nomination was deferred so long.
It would have been expedient to defer the nomination until Trajan was ready to admit
that he was old, and the announcement should, of course, have been made in Rome,
where he could have delivered an appropriate oration and shown proper deference to
the senate, where the few men who had shared his secret would lead the applause. For
that matter, it is not impossible that Trajan, when he was partly paralyzed and knew that
he was dying, did make a nomination that the precious three who surrounded him
revised in the interests of Hadrian, who was at Antioch and doubtless preparing himself
to be surprised by news of his "adoption."
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he cannot have heard the news from Cilicia without horror and despair.
Gibbon's generalization about the period "during which the condi-
tion of the human race was most happy and prosperous" has cast a
glamor over Hadrian's reign. Our contemporaries, born into a catas-
trophic age of world wars and pathetically fiedUvres arvyepov TroAe/xoio,
naturally venerate a man who contrived, by whatever means, to main-
tain for almost twenty-one years a peace, both foreign and domestic,
that was broken only by the Jewish revolt of 132. And growing economic
stringency makes it easy to see a nimbus about the head of a ruler whose
propagandists could claim that he, by cancelling unpaid taxes, non
praesentes tantum cives suos sed et posteros eorum praestitit securos.^'^ Our con-
cern here, however, is neither to aver that peace is wonderful nor to
criticize Trajan's budgets, but only to adumbrate, if we can, the senti-
ments of Tacitus, if he was still alive, when he heard the tidings that a
dying or dead princeps had secretly, in the presence only of his intriguing
wife, her lover's mother-in-law, that woman's paramour, and a young
man who was cremated immediately thereafter, given an empire (that
was not his to bestow) to a Graeculus who had married into the family
against his will, whom he, despite pressure from his artful wife, had ad-
vanced only so far as the conventions of Roman society required to avoid
scandal, and whom he had left in charge of an inactive Syrian army
while the four great marshals on whose loyalty and generalship he was
accustomed to rely were busy elsewhere. ^3 Such was the story, and
Tacitus was not a man who could say credo quia absurdum est. Had the tale
been credible, Tacitus would not have been less offended by the private
transfer ofsupreme power to a person whose character, however cunningly
^2 C.I.L. VI, 967. No one seems to have remarked that the major beneficiaries were
probably wealthy speculators and financiers who had access to "inside" information.
^3 To this must be added the fact that, while it is entirely possible that Trajan con-
tracted typhoid fever at Hatra or succumbed to some other malady, he himself believed
that he was poisoned, and his belief was certainly known in Rome, where Agrippina's
pharmaceutical skill had not been forgotten. (Some wit may have remarked that Claudius
and Trajan were both sixty-four when they ascended to Heaven.) Other suspicions or
damning circumstances surrounding the demise of Trajan, unknown to us, probably
flitted per ora virum in Roman society: the custom of transmitting news and rumors by
correspondence did not end with Cicero. It is surely otiose to remark that we are here
interested, not in establishing demonstrable historical truth, but in summarizing, on the
basis of our available sources, what was probably said and believed in influential circles
in Rome at the time, and that for our purposes it does not matter how much of the story
is rejected by modern writers who have tender feelings toward Hadrian and Plotina.
The basic work is still Wilhelm Weber's Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Kaisers Hadrianus,
Leipzig, 1907, which is much more detailed than the chapter he contributed to the
Cambridge History and examines the sources systematically.
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dissembled, must have been at least suspected, and whom no man, if not
delirious, could have fancied another Trajan. Plotina's coup de Jarnac
must have taken Rome by surprise, and we can only imagine the con-
sternation of the eminent men (perhaps including Tacitus, if he was
still alive) who must have had settled plans 6^ (probably endorsed by
Trajan) for determining the succession to the imperium, certainly with
the concurrence and possibly with the ostensible primacy of the honest
part of the senate. Neither Plotina's forged letter^s nor Hadrian's hypo-
critical apolog\^ can have deceived any one of them.
As Weber seems to have been the first to see,^^ the astounding news
must have been quickly followed by the arrival in Rome of P. Acilius
Attianus, the Praetorian Praefect,^'^ charged with the mission of con-
verting the coup de Jarnac, in which he had been one of the three partici-
pants and may have been the prime mover, into a completed coup d'etat
by means for which so talented a dissembler as Hadrian could disavow
responsibility. He arrested and ejected Baebius Macer,68 whom Trajan
had left in charge of the city; he handed out an extravagant double
donative to the troops to inspire affection for Hadrian; and he must
have proceeded to buy or intimidate the opposition. ^9 We do not know
64 They must surely have learned from the probably acute crisis that preceded the
accession of Trajan, just as the men who engineered that succession had obviously profited
from the lesson given by what happened after the assassination of Caligula.
65 So described by Cassius Dio (LXIX.i) on the basis of the researches of his father,
M'. Cassius Apronianus, who had been governor of Cilicia and seems to have been twice
consul. We may wonder what evidence of the forgery Apronianus could have found in
Cilicia long after Trajan died there, but his son assures us that Travra to. kut avrov [=
'A8pua>6v] iixefj.adT]Kei aa<f)a>s, and that implies something much more than collecting
gossip.
66 Op. cit., p. 44. 1 try to exercise care to credit such perceptions, as one credits emenda-
tions, to the first authors, and I hope I have not been guilty of an oversight here.
6"^ Hadrian's former tutor, reputed to have been the paramour of Matidia, had pre-
sumably been appointed to command of Trajan's guards at some time before Trajan's
death. We do not know how many Praetorians had been left in Rome, presumably
under the command of the other Praefect, who, so far as I can learn, may or may not
have been Sulpicius Similis at that time. Like all men engaged in conspiratorial coups
d'etat, Attianus forgot the rule that tools are discarded when no longer useful.
68 Not a man of strong character or loyalty, it seems, for it was deemed unnecessary
to murder him (Spart. Vit. Had., 5.5), and he became a prime example of the dementia
of which Hadrian boasted in an autobiography in which he doubtless applied all the
perfumes of Arabia to his spotted hands.
69 Weber, op. cit., p. 44: "Ohne ernsdiche Bedenken fur die Sicherheit des neuen
Regiments sind Attians radikale Vorschlage nicht verstandlich. In alien Teilen des
Reichs haben sich die GroBen gegen die Nachfolge Hadrians gestaubt"—and one would
expect the greatest opposition to have come from the best members of the senatorial
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the details; we do not even know to what extent he may have used the
troops to demonstrate the legitimacy of Hadrian's succession. What is
clear is that he in some way extorted from the senate decrees that gave
some cover of legality to the murder of a number of eminent men^o
whom Hadrian feared or against whom he bore grudges. In some cases
at least, the pretext was that they were conspiring against the new master,
which may have been true in the sense that they remained loyal to what
they believed or knew Trajan's intentions to have been, and may have
pondered means of displacing the usurper; they appear to have been
without troops when their official assassins overtook them, some of them
en route homeward.
We need not ask whether at this date men knew or suspected that
Hadrian intended to surrender all of Trajan's conquests: four Roman
aristocracy in Rome. That no effective opposition is recorded is in itself highly significant.
As Weber, commenting on Attianus's Wirksamkeit in Rome, says, "Man kann dies nicht
stark genug betonen." It is entirely possible that a strong conspiratorial organization
had been formed during the last years of Trajan's life to put Hadrian in power, and that
its Roman chapter was ready to strike, openly or secretly, as soon as the glad tidings
came from Cilicia; if not, Attianus's achievement is so much more remarkable that one
must credit him with a kind of genius. A vital question that we cannot answer is to
what extent the various armies in the field were under the control of Hadrian's partisans.
One notes that Trajan's trusted general, the polyonymous Q.. Marcius Turbo etc. (on
whom see Syme, J.R.S., LH (1962), pp. 87 ff.), was, exceptionally, a commander on
whom Hadrian felt that he could rely from the first (Spart. Vit. Had. 5.8). A. lulius
Quadratus, whom Hadrian sent to Dacia when Nigrinus was removed and destined for
assassination, may have been of less certain allegiance; he died soon thereafter.
^OThe number of prominent victims is uncertain. Dio (LXIX.4), after naming A.
Cornelius Palma, L. Publilius Celsus, C. Avidius Nigrinus, and Lusius Quietus, whom
Hadrian killed on a pretext of conspiracy against him, adds, evidently among those killed
at the very first, oi 8e, e<f>' iripois S^ riaiv iyKX-qfiaaiv, ola fieydXa Svvd^evoi. Kal irXovrov /cot
Sd^ijf ev TJKOvres. We do not know who those wealthy and illustrious men were, nor can
we be sure of the chronology of the purge. Dio says that it was carried out iv rfj apxjj,
and Spartianus says (7.3) that the four consulars were killed uno tempore, and that Lusius
Quietus was killed in itinere, presumably on his way home to Mauretania. For what it
is worth, I note an indication that I do not remember having seen in the historians who
have recently treated this period. Graetz, op. cit., p. 126 (cf. pp. 406 ff.), reports a Jewish
tradition that two insurgents in Judaea were on the point of being executed when their
request for divine intervention was promptly answered by the arrival of the news that
Hadrian had discharged Lusius Quietus: "Der Tag der Befreiung . . . am zwolften
Addar (im Februar 118?), wurde als ein denkwiirdig-freudiges Ereignis verewigt; das
Synhedrion setzte ihn ... in den Kalendar . . . unter dem Namen Trajanstag {Jam
Tirjanus) ein." The name of the holiday, however, indicates rejoicing over the death of
Trajan, and one cannot believe that the news of that happy event took six months to
reach a people desperately interested in it.
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provinces, Mesopotamia, Assyria, Armenia, and even Dacia.'^i When
Hadrian began to appease the Parthians,72 thus foreshadowing the craven
policy of subsidizing, instead of defeating, the enemy,73 is not important.
It is unnecessary to conjecture to what extent contemporaries could
have apprehended that the new master, varius, multiplex, multiformis,'^^
would begin the process by which the Roman Empire would cease to
be Roman in its culture, its mentality, and its ruHng class, so that, as
Eduard Fraenkel observed, ''s -^ve see in Tacitus the last expositor of the
indomitable spirit and lucid mind that created the Empire: he was the
ultimus Romanorum.
We need only ask ourselves what the coming of Acilius Attianus would
have meant to Tacitus, if he lived to witness it.
If Tacitus was a man whom Hadrian or his confederates had cause to
remember as devoted to the policies of which Trajan had been the avatar,
and if he had or was believed to have noteworthy influence, he may have
been marked for an informal and unostentatious liquidation. That, of
course, is an entirely gratuitous conjecture, possible only because we
cannot name a source that would certainly preserve for us a notice of
his death.
Let us consider the only alternative. Tacitus, a distinguished member
of the senate, would almost necessarily attend the sessions at which that
body performs under the direction of the newcome ringmaster and
authorizes the assassination of the men who had been great under Trajan.
Even if he did not attend those sessions, Tacitus was a senator, and it is
a moral certainty that he would have remembered one of the most
eloquent passages in all literature: "Nostrae duxere Helvidium in
carcerem manus . . . nos innocenti sanguine Senecio perfudit." Domitian
had returned.
It was not merely that a man past sixty could scarcely hope to live to
a future in which it might conceivably be possible to say again, "etiam
nostri superstites sumus." The great effort that put Trajan in power, the
high and audacious resolve to amalgamate "res olim dissociabiles,
principatum ac libertatem," the last Titanic thrust of the Roman will-
to-power—all had failed. Nunc demum abit animus! To my mind, it is
71 I see no reason to doubt the intention reported by Eutropius, VII.6. Dacia pre-
sented some administrative problems, as shown by the immediate reorganization of its
government, and Hadrian would not have cared about the multi cives Romani whom Trajan
had settled there. "^^ Spart. 5.4.
''^Epit. de Caesaribus, 14.10. With this goes the "Chinese wall" in England and a
resort to purely defensive measures, which never succeed against a persistent enemy.
74 Ibid., 14.6. 75 J{eue Jahrbikherfur Wissenschaft, 1932, pp. 218-233.
314 Illinois Classical Studies, II
inconceivable that if Tacitus lived to see that bitter day of dissolution, he
would have had the heart to write another line.''^ He was, furthermore,
a prudent man, not given to vainglorious displays of futile courage
ambitiosa morte, and he may have had progeny or others dear to him
whose inheritance and whose future, such as it might be in the new age,
he would not willingly compromise; perceiving that the time ubi quae
sentias dicere licet had passed away, he may well have consigned the pages
of his unfinished Ab excessu divi Augusti to a scrinium, there to await, as
had the histories of the elder Seneca almost a century before, a day when
truth, grown obsolete, might be told without peril.
University of Illinois at Urbana
"^6 Or many lines, if, as Koestermann believes {supra, n. 31), the last twenty chapters
of our extant text were written under emotion excited by Hadrian's bloody inaugural.
That is possible, but the rather numerous points in the early books at which Syme sees
oblique allusions to Hadrian, which may prove no more than that history repeats itself
and that human crimes are sadly lacking in variety, are certainly parallels that delators
or even Hadrian himself could have noticed; to have published them after the coup d'etat
would have been to take a risk gratuitously and with no possible hope that the books
could serve either to reform or to displace the new boss.
